D.D Zhidu & Co.

19/02/2026

*Otuedon v. Ofor (2025) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1984) 783, SC.*

*ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION:*

Whether the Court of Appeal properly evaluated the evidence during trial to conclude that the appellant failed to establish his case according to law and therefore was not entitled to the reliefs sought.

*FACTS OF THE CASE:*

The appellant claimed he was the head and accredited representative of the Prince Otuedon family of Ugbolokposo town. His claim against the respondent was that sometime in November, 2013 during a routine check on his family land at Ugbolokposo, he discovered that the respondent and his work men and privies had trespassed on a portion of his family land. All efforts to stop the respondent and his privies from further trespassing thereon proved abortive. He then filed a claim at the High Court of Delta State claiming several declaratory reliefs.

Parties joined issues and the matter went to trial. The learned trial judge, in a considered judgment dismissed the case of the appellant. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Further dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

*Held (Unanimously dismissing the appeal):*

*1.On burden of proof on party who asserts.*

The law is that he who asserts must prove. The burden of proof rests on the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue in dispute.

Ndukwe v. Acha (1998) 6 NWLR(Pt. 552) 25; Yusuf v. Adegoke (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt.1045) 332; Ajide v. Kelani (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt.12) 248 referred to.] (P. 794, paras. E-G)

*2.On duty on plaintiff to adduce cogent and positive evidence in claim of title to land.*

In order to succeed in a claim of title to land, a plaintiff must establish cogent and positive evidence. (P. 794, paras. G-H)

*3.On treatment of fact pleaded on which no evidence adduced.*

Pleadings are not evidence. Thus, averments in pleadings on which no evidence is adduced are deemed abandoned. This is because pleadings do not constitute or amount to evidence. In the instant case, the appellant did not adduce any oral or documentary evidence to show the exact location of the land in dispute or to show long possession or ownership of adjoining plots of land.

Elegushi v. Oseni (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 348; Abe v. Damawa (2023) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1871) 335 referred to.] (Pp. 794-795, paras. H-B)

*4.On essence of equitable doctrine of laches and acquiescence.*

The essence of the equitable doctrine of acquiescence is that if a land owner stood by when a stranger developed his land in good faith without the owner appraising the stranger of the defect of his title, such owner would be estopped from reaping the benefit of such development, and a court of equity would not assist him in enforcing his right.

Ikuomola v. Oniwaya (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 617 referred to.] (Pp. 795-796, paras. G-A)

*5.On attitude of Supreme Court to concurrent findings of lower courts.*

The Supreme Court will only disturb the findings of facts made by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal when they are either perverse or based on a fundamental error of law, either substantive or procedural. In the instant case, the appellant was unable to show that a real miscarriage of justice was occasioned to him to warrant interference with the concurrent findings and decision by the lower courts.

Bamgboye v. Olarewaju (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 132; Fagbenro v. Arobadi (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt. 978) 172; Odunukwe v. Ofomata (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 404 referred to.] (P. 797, paras. B-D).

Counsel:

D. E. Agbaga, Esq. - for the Appellant.

S. A. Aterere, Esq. (with him, C.N. Okwori, Esq.) - for the Respondent.

Researched and edited by:
GODSPOWER EROGA, ESQ.
19-2-2026.

20/01/2026

*SSS & ORS v. ADAMU(2020)* *LPELR-50365(CA)*

Principle
*CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS - Instance(s) of a breach/violation of fundamental rights;whether fundamental rights are absolute rights*

"The Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) guarantees the fundamental rights of every person in Nigeria in Chapter IV. The rights are so important that they are considered as standing above other laws of the land outside the Constitution. SeeBadejo V Federal Ministry of Education (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 464) 15, 41 and Anzaku V Governor of Nasarawa State (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 919) 448, 483. Those rights however are not absolute as they may be a derogation from them as provided for in the Constitution. The fundamental rights in focus in this matter are the rights to personal liberty and dignity of the human person guaranteed in Sections 35 and 34, respectively, of the Constitution. The power of the appellants to arrest and detain a person is traceable to Section 2(3) of the National Security Agencies Act of 2004 and the exceptions provided in Section 35(1) of the Constitution. In particular Section 35(1)(c) of the Constitution provides as follows: "(1) Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law - ... (c) for the purpose of bringing him before a Court in ex*****on of the order of a Court or upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence". At this stage, I shall take the liberty of setting out the relevant depositions of the parties hereunder: ?The respondent deposed in paragraphs 3 - 12 of his affidavit as follows: "3. That sometime on the 21st day of February, 2018 at about 11:30am I was called through my cell number by the President of the Law Student Association (LAWSA) to come to the school for an undisclosed activity. 4. That on arriving at the school premises, I went straight to the faculty of law to meet the President of the Law Student Association (LAWSA) where I am presently undergoing my undergraduate studies in Law. 5. That at the faculty of law I met with the faculty's sub - dean, the examination officer, the President (LAWSA) and one DSS Officer named Mrs. J.K. Diblang. 6. That the said Mrs. J.K. Diblang started explaining to me that I am wanted at the Office of the Chief Security Officer of the School (C.S.O.). 7. That pursuant to paragraph 6 above, I then demanded from Mrs. J.K. Diblang to know the reason why I am wanted but was told that I will know when I get there. 8. That upon getting to the office of the chief security officer, the DSS Officer, Mrs. J.K. Diblang after discussions with the chief security officer ordered my arrest. 9. That following the 4th Respondent orders, I was immediately arrested at the Chief Security Officer's Office (C.S.O) by Four (4) DSS officers without any provocation or reason for my arrest given. 10. That pursuant to paragraph 9 supra. I was handcuffed in both hands and legs before students and staff of Nasarawa State University, Keffi as I was then immediately bundled into a waiting van accompanied by Four (4) heavily armed men from the Department of State Security (DSS) and taken to their office in Lafia. 11. That upon arriving at DSS office in Lafia on the 21st day of February, 2018, at late noon, I was interrogated for hours, striped naked and photographed by the DSS officers. 12. That I was subjected to series of interrogations, humiliation and harassment from the hours of 4:00pm of the 21st February, 2018 to the hours of 18:30pm, 23rd day of February, 2018". On the other hand, the appellants deposed in paragraphs 3(a)(b)(c)(d) and (e), and 7 of their counter - affidavit as follows: "a. That the Applicant was arrested in Keffi, Nasarawa State on reasonable suspicion of committing offence of fraud. b. That the Applicant in concert with Two (2) persons send a threatening message to the Governor of Nasarawa State, Umar Tanko Almakura and his Deputy Silas Ali Garba, demanding the sum of Two Hundred Thousand United State Dollars ($200,000) or risk being investigated by EFCC for corruption. c. That the Applicant was arrested on the 21st February, 2018, and was released on the 22nd February, 2018, on administrative bail, pending the conclusion of investigation. d. That the Applicant release was as a result of the Respondents inability to conclude investigation within 48 hours and in compliance with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). e. That the Respondents did not violate the Fundamental rights of the Applicant, as the Applicant was released less than 48 hours of his arrest. 7. That the Respondents did not exhibit any act which may be viewed as prosecutorial misconduct, malicious process or misfeasance in public office against the Applicant which Applicant may consider as infringement or violation of their Fundamental Human Rights as enshrined by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria". ?As can be seen above, the appellants admitted the arrest and detention of the respondent by them. The result is that the burden was on the appellants to justify the same. See Sandy V Hotogua 14 WACA 18 and Iyere V Duru (1986) 11 - 12 SC 19, 46. The justification offered by the appellants is to be found in paragraphs 3(a) and (b) of their counter - affidavit. For ease of reference though at the pain of repetition, I shall again set out the depositions: "a. That the Applicant was arrested in Keffi, Nasarawa State on reasonable suspicion of committing offence of fraud. b. That the Applicant in concert with two (2) persons send a threatening message to the Governor of Nasarawa State, Umar Tanko Almakura and His Deputy Silas Ali Garba, demanding the sum of Two Hundred Thousand United State Dollars (sic) ($200,000) or risk being investigated by EFCC for corruption". The learned Judge of the lower Court was not impressed with the depositions above and made it very clear in his lordship's judgment at page 47 of the record of appeal as follows: "This is an affidavit evidence matter, it behoves on the respondents, to support their defence with credible evidence. The Court will not be a party to a situation where the security agency will just come and tell the Court "upon reasonable suspicion". The Court must be convinced that there is indeed reasonable suspicion. (Can therefore the arrest be said to be lawful? Where there is no proof of any reasonable suspicion).I doubt much". In order to justify the arrest of a person on the basis that he was reasonably suspected of having committed a crime, there must be facts deposed to in the affidavit upon which the Court can reach a conclusion that there was indeed reasonable suspicion that he committed the offence. The test of the existence of reasonable suspicion is that of a reasonable person acting without passion and prejudice. In Oteri V Okorodudu (1970) LPELR - 2824 (SC) - P. 10 the Supreme Court stated as follows: "In our view the test to be applied, with the onus of proof on a defendant seeking to justify his conduct, was laid down in 1838 by Tindal, C.J. in Allen V Wright 8 Car. and P. 522 where he said that it must be that of a reasonable person acting without passion and prejudice. The matter must be looked at objectively, and in the light of the facts known to the defendant at the time, and not on subsequent facts that come to light ..." ?The deposition of the appellants were bare assertions with no iota of supporting facts, materials or evidence to prop up the assertions. By what means was the threat message sent? Was it oral, documentary, by GSM text message or by Whatsapp? If it was by document, why was a copy of it not attached to the affidavit? If it was by GSM text message or Whatsapp or any other internet platform why was the call log or a transcript of it not attached to the counter - affidavit as an exhibit? It was not deposed by the appellants that there was any preliminary investigation to ground their belief or assertion that there was reasonable suspicion that the respondent committed the offence to warrant the Court to reach such a conclusion. An imperious and magisterial declaration that the respondent was arrested on reasonable suspicion of committing the offence of fraud and that he sent a threat message will not suffice. It must be remembered that the power of the 1st appellant is subject to judicial control and that those who feel called upon to deprive others of their fundamental rights must be prepared to justify their actions with facts and not magisterial or imperious declarations. *The appellants approached the matter as Humpty - Dumpty who asserted that: "When I say this it must be so" - And why? "Because I say so and consider it to be in the interest of justice", as quoted by Eso, JSC, though in a slightly different context, in Willoughby V International Merchant Bank (Nig.) Limited (1987) LPELR - (SC) Page 22. Again, there is absolutely nothing to show that a report of any kind was made against the respondent or, as I have already stated, any preliminary investigation was made by the appellants to ascertain that grounds existed to reasonably suspect that the respondent committed the offence.* In Fawehinmi V Inspector - General of Police (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 367) 606, 681, Uwaifo, JSC, opined as follows: *"I think I can say this that in a proper investigation procedure, it is unlawful to arrest until there is sufficient evidence upon which to charge and caution a suspect. It is completely wrong to arrest, let alone caution a suspect, before the police look for evidence implicating him".* The lower Court was therefore right in holding that the arrest of the respondent by the appellants was not lawful. Appellants' counsel harped on the point that the respondent was released within 48 hours of his arrest and so liability cannot attach to the appellants as they complied with Section 35(4) and (5) of the Constitution. Before one proceeds to consider the length of incarceration, where a person says that he was unlawfully arrested, the Court must first consider the constitutionality or lawfulness of the arrest. If his arrest in the first place was unconstitutional or unlawful, the speed of his release cannot avail the party who arrested him; liability still attaches to that party for the wrongful arrest. The length of detention will be relevant only to the issue of the amount of damages to be awarded. *The speed of the victim's release cannot cure the unlawfulness of the arrest.* Apart from finding that the arrest of the respondent was wrongful, the trial Court found that the respondent was treated in a degrading manner. See page 49 of the record of appeal. I have perused the grounds of appeal in the notice of appeal at pages 36 - 41 of record. There is no specific ground of appeal which attacks the specific finding. The result is that the finding is deemed to have been accepted by the appellants and it remains binding on the parties. See Chudi Verdical Co. Ltd V Ifesinachi Industries (Nig) Ltd (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 520, 537. I therefore answer issue 2 in the affirmative and resolve it against the appellants." Per JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, JCA (Pp 14 - 24 Paras D - C)

17/01/2026

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - PRELIMINARY OBJECTION - When an affidavit would be necessary to file a preliminary objection.
"Now, a Preliminary Objection is generally an objection against the regularity of a court process i.e. a suit or motion. The primary objective of such an objection is to terminate the proceedings at the stage the objection is raised. In other words, the effect of a Preliminary Objection is to nullify the proceedings, See OKOI V IBIANG (2002) 10 N.W.L.R (pt. 776) P. 455; OROBU V ANEKWE (1997) 5 NWLR(pt. 506) P.618. A Preliminary Objection may or may not be supported by affidavit. It all depends on what is being objected to. Where the objection is based on law, an affidavit may not be necessary, but if it is based on the facts, an affidavit is mandatory, In other words, where the preliminary Objection deals strictly with issues of law, there is no need for any supporting affidavit, but only the grounds for the objection need be clearly stated. However, when the objection leaves the province of law and dwells on facts of the case, the party relying on such Preliminary Objection must support same by filing an affidavit. In that respect, where a preliminary Objection is raised on point of law, and relevant facts upon which the objection is based are before the Court, there is no need for additional affidavit evidence to be filed. It is only where there are conflicting assertions as to any fact relating to the objection, or where the facts are not before the Court; that such an objection ought to be supported by an affidavit which would ensure that all relevant materials are placed before the Court for a proper determination of the objection. See AMAH V NWANKWO (2007) 12 N.W.L.R (Pt.1049) P.552 at P.578: A.G: FEDERATION V A.N.P.P (2003) 18 N.W.L.R (Pt.851) P.182 at P. 207 PARAS A-D; and ODEDIRAN V N.P.A (2004) 7 N.W.L.R (Pt.872) P.230. My understanding of the law from the authorities cited above is that, a Preliminary Objection need not be supported by an affidavit so long as enough material is placed before the Court on which it can judiciously pronounce on the Preliminary Objection. I am fortified by the decision of Edozie, J.C.A (as he then was) in the case of OKOI V IBIANG (Supra) at PP. 469-470, where His Lordship cited and relied on the decision of Achike, J.C.A (as he then was) in the case of BELLO V N.B.N (1992) 6 N.W.L.R (Pt. 246) P.206 at P.219 where His Lordship held thus: "Certainly, there is no hard and fast rule that a Preliminary Objection need be supported by an affidavit so long as enough material is placed before the trial court on which it can judiciously pronounce on the Preliminary Objection. Where the alleged offending writ of summons ex facie contains the relevant information against which an objection is being raised, it seems to me that the necessity to additionally rely on affidavit evidence is uncalled for. In the case in hand, it does not appear to me that what the respondent needed was an affidavit but particulars of the grounds of their objection to the motion for committal to enable them prepare for argument on the Preliminary Objection."
Per HARUNA MOH'D TSAMMANI ,JCA (Pp. 25-27, para. A-A)

01/01/2026

Happy New year 2026! May God bless you with peace, health and happiness. May he guide every step you take towards a brighter and more meaningful future.
~Barr. D. D. Zhidu

25/12/2025

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09/11/2025

08/11/2025

B.P.E. v. BFI Group Corp. (2025) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1976) 371, SC.

Issues:

1. Whether Forms 48 and 49 as well as the motion for committal were properly served on the 1st and 2nd appellants.

2. Whether the 2nd appellant was rightly convicted of contempt of court in the circumstances of this case.

Facts:

The 1st appellant, desirous of privatizing the Aluminum Smelter Company of Nigeria (ALSCON), advertised for expression of interest from interested bidders. At the close of the biddings process, the respondent was declared the winner of the bid with the requirement that the respondent should pay 10% of the bid price within 15 working days of signing the Share Purchase Agreement. The outstanding 90% bid price was to be paid within 90 calendar days thereafter. However, the 1st appellant disagreed with the requirement and stated that the respondent was required to pay 10% of the bid price within 15 working days of the receipt of the acceptance letter. On 8th July 2004 the 1st appellant terminated the contract between the parties. The respondent was aggrieved by the termination of the contract and it sued the 1st appellant at the Federal High Court claiming several declaratory and injunctive reliefs as well as an order of specific performance. In a judgment delivered on 17th December 2009, the trial court found that there was no valid or enforceable contract between the parties capable of being enforced by the court and thereby dismissed the respondent’s claim. Dissatisfied, the respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal, which also dismissed the suit. Still dissatisfied, the respondent appealed further to the Supreme Court. In its judgment delivered on 6th July 2012 the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Federal High Court and the Court of Appeal and, inter alia, granted an order of specific performance of the Share Purchase Agreement. It directed the 1st appellant to provide the mutually agreed Share Purchase Agreement for ex*****on by the parties to enable the respondent pay the agreed 10% of the accepted bid price of $410 million (that is, the sum of $41 million) within 15 working days from the date of the ex*****on of the Share PurchaseAgreement and the 90% balance within 90 calendar days thereafter. It also granted an order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st appellant, its servants, agents, privies, management or howsoever called from inviting any further bidding for the sale and acquisition of ALSCON in violation of the contract between the appellants and the respondent and/or from negotiating to sell, selling, transferring or otherwise handing over the Aluminum Smelter Company of Nigeria to any person or persons in violation of the contract between the appellant and respondent. The Supreme Court judgment was reported as B.F.I. Group Corp. v. B.P.E. (2012) 18 NWLR (Part.1332) 209. Sequel to the judgment of the Supreme Court, the respondent filed an originating motion at the Federal High Court Abuja in suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/901/2013 for the enforcement of the orders of the Supreme Court. The application was granted. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Federal High Court granting the enforcement, the appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal. Although the Court of Appeal set aside the enforcement order as made by the Federal High Court, the court positively delivered its judgment in line with the earlier decision of the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the appellants forwarded the Share Purchase Agreement to the respondent to execute its portion. Upon signing its portion of the Share Purchase Agreement, the respondent attached some annexures which it considered material to the Share Purchase Agreement. However, the 1st appellant disagreed with the annexures and insisted that the said annexures did not form part of the mutually agreed Share Purchase Agreement. The respondent on its part emphatically argued that the annexures formed part of the Share Purchase Agreement and were referenced and incorporated in various clauses contained in the Share Purchase Agreement. While this controversy was still on-going, the 1st appellant, by a press release dated 2nd February 2019 signed by the Head, Public Communications, disclosed that it was engaging in contractual agreements with DHL/RUSAL. The said agreements were being made despite the enforcement order made by the Court of Appeal on 11th January 2019 and also in violation of the injunctive order of the Supreme Court. As a result, the respondent commenced committal proceedings against the 1st and 2nd appellants for disobedience of the orders of court. The affidavits of service of Forms 48 and 49 on the appellants clearly stated that the Forms were each served upon them “personally to the Registry of the Director General of the Bureau of Public Enterprises”. The motion for committal to prison dated 11th April 2019 with hearing notice were also served personally to the registry. The trial court found the appellants liable and proceeded to sentence the 2nd appellant, who was its Chief Executive, to prison custody for a period of one month or beyond until he purged himself of the contempt. Dissatisfied, the appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court where they contended that service of the committal processes on a staff in the office of the Director General of the Bureau of Public Enterprises amounted to substituted service and not personal service as required by law. They argued that even though the 2nd appellant was the Director General of the 1st appellant, service of the Forms on his office (where he was the Director General) was not proper service in law and ought not to be countenanced. They contended further that the 1st appellant complied with its side of the obligations prescribed by the orders of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal by forwarding the Share Purchase Agreement to the respondent for its ex*****on, and that it was the respondent which frustrated the ex*****on of the Agreement with the unilateral introduction of certain annexures that were not originally part of the Share Purchase Agreement.

*Held (Unanimously dismissing the appeal):*

*1.On how judgment summons served.*

By virtue of Order IX rule 5(1) of the Judgment Enforcement Rules, a judgment summons shall be served personally in accordance with the rules for personal service of an ordinary summons issued from the court from which the judgment summons is issued. (P. 395, paras. C-D)

*2.On bindingness of decision of court on parties and whether can be ignored by parties.*

Subject to being overruled by a higher court or conceivably by a statute, the decision of a court is binding as between the parties, and cannot be ignored or set aside by anyone, including (indeed it may fairly be said, least of all) the executive. (P. 405, paras. G-H)

*3.On duty on parties to obey court order and nature of.*

A court order must be obeyed unless and until it has been set aside or varied by the court. The duty to obey a court order which has not been set aside is a rule of law, and not merely a matter of good practice. This duty persists even where it is perceived or contended that the court order is a nullity. In the instant case, for all intents and purposes it was mandatory for the parties to ensure that the orders and state of affairs declared by the Supreme Court in Appeal No: SC/12/2004 and the consequent enforcement orders of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/A/637/2014 were enforced. (Pp. 405-406, paras. H-B).

*4.On duty on parties to obey court order and power of court to commit for contempt for failure to carry out its order.*

Where an individual is enjoined by an order of the court to do or to refrain from doing a particular act, he has a duty to carry out that order. The court has a duty to commit that individual for contempt of its orders where he deliberately fails to carry out such orders. Ezekiel-Hart v. Ezekiel-Hart (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) 276 referred to, (P. 414, paras. A-B)

*5.On duty on court to ensure obedience to its judgments and orders.*

The court’s responsibility is not restricted to simply delivering judgments but the court has a vital role to preserve its integrity by ensuring that it's judgments and orders are not flouted or treated with contempt. In the instant case, the appellants chose to blatantly ignore the orders of the Supreme Court and there must be consequences for such disregard. (P. 422, paras. A-B)

*6.On what amounts to contempt of court.*

Any conduct by which the course of justice is perverted either by a party or a stranger is deemed to be a contempt. (P. 396, paras. D-E)

*7.On what amounts to contempt of court.*

Acts which are calculated to undermine the authority of the court and negatively interfere with the confidence of the citizen in the efficacy of its orders will undoubtedly be considered as contempt.(P. 396, para. E)

*8.On rationale for contempt proceedings.*

Contempt proceedings are a vital aspect of maintaining the authority, effectiveness, and dignity of the judiciary. (P. 396, paras. D)

*9.On when court may order person to be committed to prison for failure to obey court order.*

By virtue of section 72 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, where any person refuses or neglects to comply with an order made against him, other than for payment of money, the court, instead of dealing with him as a judgment debtor guilty of the misconduct defined in paragraph of section 66 of the Act, may order that he be committed to prison and detained in custody until he has obeyed the order in all things that are to be immediately performed and given such security as the court thinks fit to obey the other parts of the order, if any, at the future times thereby appointed, or incase of his no longer having the power to obey the order then until he has been imprisoned for such time or until he has paid such fine as the court directs. (Pp. 394-395, paras. H-C)

*10.On procedure for committal for disobedience of court order.*

By virtue of Order IX rule 13 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules:

(a) When an order enforceable by committal under section 72 of the Act has been made the registrar shall, if the order was made in the absence of the judgment debtor and isfor the delivery of goods without the optionof paying their value or is in the nature ofan injunction, at the time when the orderis drawn up, and in any other case, on theapplication of the judgment creditor, issuea copy of the order endorsed with a noticein Form 48, and the copy so endorsed shallbe served on the judgment debtor in likemanner as a judgment summons.

(b) If the judgment debtor fails to obey theorder the registrar on the application ofthe judgment creditor shall issue a noticein Form 49 not less than two clear daysafter service of the endorsed copy of theorder, and the notice shall be served onthe judgment debtor in like manner as ajudgment summons.

(c) On the day named in the notice, if the judgment debtor does not appear, the court, on being satisfied that the judgment debtor has failed to obey the order and-
(i)that the notice has been served on him; and
(ii)if the order was made in his absence,that the endorsed copy thereof has also been served on him, may order that he be committed to prison and that a warrant of commitment may issue. (Pp. 395-396, paras. D-A)

*11. On need to effect personal service on person sought to be committed for contempt of court and exception thereto.*

By virtue of Order 35 rule 2(2) of the Federal High Court Rules, notice of motion, affidavit, grounds and a written address shall be served personally on the person sought to be committed except where, upon leave of court, personal service may be dispensed with by substituted service. (P. 396, paras. A-C)

*12.On importance of issuance and proper service of Forms 48 and 49 in contempt proceedings.*

By virtue of Order IX rule 13 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules the issuance and proper service of Form 48 (Notice of consequences of disobedience to order of court) and Form 49 (Notice to show cause why order of committal should not be made) are crucial elements that not only go to the root of the case, but the jurisdiction of the court. They are also vital in ensuring due process and fairness in contempt cases.
Odu v. Jolaoso (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt.823) 547 referred to.] (P. 396, paras. G-H)

*13.On purport and importance of personal service of Forms 48 and 49 in contempt proceedings.*

The importance of proper (personal) service of Forms 48 and 49, a fundamental component of due process in contempt proceedings, cannot be overemphasized. These forms serve as official notifications to the contemnor, explicitly outlining the consequences of disobedience to a court order or judgment. Service ensures that the individual is made aware of the allegations against him; and signaling to the contemnor the initiation of contempt proceedings. This notice is not merely a formality but a fundamental right that ensures individuals are informed of the charges against them. It aligns with the broader principle that justice should not only be done but should also be seen to be done. By this means, the contemnor is given the opportunity to respond to the allegations in line with the principles of natural justice and fairness. (Pp. 397-398, paras. H-C)

*14.On how to effect service of court processes on Bureau of Public Enterprises.*

By virtue of section 24 of the Bureau of Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act, Cap. P38 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, a notice, summons or other document required or authorized to be served upon the Bureau under the provisions of the Act or any other law or enactment may be served by delivering it to the Director-General or by sending it by registered post and addressed to the Director-General at the principal office of the Bureau. (P. 398, paras. E-F)

*15.On how to effect service of court processes on Bureauof Public Enterprises.*

In any legal proceedings involving the Bureau ofPublic Enterprises, service of any court processes including notices, summons, etc., must be addressed to the Director-General of the Enterprises, and delivered to him/her at the principal office of the Enterprises. In the instant case, both Forms 48 and 49 were delivered by the bailiff personally to the Director General’s Registry at the Bureau of Public Enterprises Office, Abuja. (P. 399, paras. A-B)

*16.On whether Bureau of Public Enterprises can be subject of contempt proceedings.*

By virtue of section 12 of the Bureau of Public Enterprises Act, the Bureau of Public Enterprises is a juristic person that can sue and be sued, and is capable of being a subject of contempt proceedings. (P. 400, para. G)

*17.On who is accountable for contempt of court orders by company or statutory body.*

Once there is an allegation of contempt of court orders against a company or statutory body, the court will not hesitate to hold accountable the directing minds of such entity. (P. 400, paras. G-H)

*18.On whether concept of corporate personality absolute.*

The concept of corporate personality, which in law recognizes a company upon incorporation or statutory body upon establishment as an artificial person separate and distinct entity altogether from its members or officers, is not absolute. In certain cases the courts will not hesitate to disregard the existence of the concept of corporate personality and pay regard instead to what really lies behind and the identity of those behind the legal facade for purposes of holding them personally liable for the liabilities or wrongs committed by the company. (Pp. 400-401, paras. H-C)

*19.On whether members or officers of company liable for acts or omissions thereof.*

The law generally does not allow going behind the separate entity accorded the company or statutory body to hold members or officers liable personally for acts or omissions adjudged those of the company or statutory body. (P. 401, para. A)

*20.On when veil of corporate personality will be lifted.*

The corporate personality concept, under express statutory provisions as well as under common law does not in all cases shield the person who seeks its use most especially for fraudulent purposes or, as in the instant case, to be used as an instrument to perpetuate acts of disobedience of lawful court orders.
I.B.W.A. v. Sasegbon (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt.1059) 195 referred to,(P. 401, paras. C-D)

*21.On who can be sanctioned for contempt of court order by company or statutory body.*

If any corporate entity disobeys a judicial order, the corporate officer responsible for the entity’s disobedience can be sanctioned for contempt. (P. 401, paras. D-E)

Per ABUBAKAR, J.S.C. at pages 401-402, paras.G-B:

“Indeed, the 2nd appellant as the 1st appellant’s Director-General and its Chief Executive, is at the helms of the 1st appellant’s affairs and is the official responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Bureau. In this case, the 2nd appellant’s name featured prominently in all the correspondences and agreements, particularly the mutually agreed SPA. It is thus not out of place to say that he should beheld accountable for acts or omission of the 1st appellant which are seen to be contemptuous. Therefore, where an allegation of disobedience of court orders warranting committal proceedings is made against the 1st appellant, it is mandatory that the relevant court summons or notices be issued against the 2nd appellant so long as he acts in his capacity as the Director-General of the 1st appellant. In this case, service of Forms 48 and 49 by the bailiff of the trial court by delivery “personally on the D.G.S. Registry, B.P.E. Office, Abuja” seems to me proper and sufficient service on both appellants.”

*22.On how to effect service of writ or other court process on company.*

By virtue of Order 6 rule 8 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019, where the suit is against a corporation or a company authorized to sue and be sued in its corporate name or in the name of an officer or trustee, the writ or any other document may be served, subject to the enactment establishing that corporation or company or under which the company is registered as the case maybe, by giving the writ or document to any Director, Secretary or other principal officer, or by leaving itat the office of the corporation or company. (P. 418, paras. F-H)

*23.On what amounts to personal service on company.*

When it relates to a company or corporation, service of court process on any Director, Secretary or other principal officer or by leaving it at the office of the corporation or company is personal service. Unlike natural persons who can receive service of processes in person, an artificial person can only receive service through its officers or by leaving same at its corporate office. In the instant case, the argument of the appellant that the respondent ought to have sought and obtained leave for substituted service was wrong as service on a staff or any of the officers mentioned is personal service to a corporation. (Pp. 418-419, paras. H-B)

*24.On when veil of incorporation will be lifted and Chief Executive held responsible for contempt by company.*

When there is an allegation of contempt of the orders of court as in the instant case, nothing stops the veil of incorporation from being lifted to hold the chief executive responsible as a natural person. (P. 419, para. D)

*25. On treatment of admitted fact and whether needs further proof.*

Facts admitted need no further proof and same will be taken as established. In the instant case, there was nowhere on record that the appellants denied making the publication dated 2nd February 2019. Hence, it was safe for the court to deem it as an admitted fact.
Motunwase v. Sorungbe (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 90 referred to.] (P. 421, paras. G-H)

*26.On duty on court in interpretation of clear and unambiguous words of statute.*

Where the words of a statute are clear, there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation which are merely presumptuous in cases of ambiguity in the statute. The court should not impute meanings into the clear words of the provisions of a statute to conform with its view or that of counsel in the case, or based on what the meaning of the provision ought to be. In the instant case, the provision of section 24 of the Bureau of Public Enterprises Act is clear and straight forward and does not necessarily require a foray into any other provision of the Act or any other legislation in order to decipher the intention of the draftsman. (Pp. 398-399, paras. G-A)

Counsel:

A. U. Mustapha, SAN (with him, S. S. Umoru, Kanayo Okafor, Esq. Ossy Ehikioya, Esq. and A. A. Ago, Esq. -for the Appellants.

P.I.N. Ikwueto, SAN (with him, Chinedu Ezeh, Esq.; C.C.Emekekwe, Esq. and J. U. Nwosu, Esq. -for the Respondent.

~GODSPOWER EROGA, ESQ.
4-11-2025.