Fletcher Russia & Eurasia Program

Fletcher Russia & Eurasia Program The Russia and Eurasia Program at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University

We recently hosted a webinar featuring journalists from Radio Marneuli, an independent, multilingual community radio sta...
05/26/2026

We recently hosted a webinar featuring journalists from Radio Marneuli, an independent, multilingual community radio station located in the Kvemo Kartli region of Georgia. The session featured Kamilla Mamedova, the station’s founder and director, and Vladimer Chkhitunidze, a veteran journalist focusing on corruption and minority rights. The discussion centered on the existential threats facing independent media in Georgia and the shifting geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus.

Daniel Drezner reflects on the notion that the United States has won the war with Iran
05/06/2026

Daniel Drezner reflects on the notion that the United States has won the war with Iran

If hostilities with Iran have been terminated that means the U.S. won, right? Right?!

Mikhail Troitskiy highlights the value of "transparent multilateralism" on a Geneva Security Debate panel
05/06/2026

Mikhail Troitskiy highlights the value of "transparent multilateralism" on a Geneva Security Debate panel

1 like. "Multilateralism Under Pressure: Can International Negotiations Still Deliver?"

Chris Miller on Russia's designs for Ukraine and Europe.
04/07/2026

Chris Miller on Russia's designs for Ukraine and Europe.

That’s why he hasn’t accepted the Trump peace plan. He’s a czar, not a businessman, and he wants to swallow Ukraine.

Mikhail Troitskiy weighs in on Russia's post-crisis prognosis in the Russian Analytical Digest: Mapping Russia’s Incenti...
04/07/2026

Mikhail Troitskiy weighs in on Russia's post-crisis prognosis in the Russian Analytical Digest: Mapping Russia’s Incentives for Change in Postwar Scenarios. Link in first comment.

Readout from our recent highly popular conference, Supply Chain Conflict: Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War and China-...
04/07/2026

Readout from our recent highly popular conference, Supply Chain Conflict: Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War and China-U.S. Economic Relations, is now available. See link in first comment.

Latest by Chris Miller in Financial TimesAmid discussion in Washington about whether the Trump administration will loose...
02/24/2026

Latest by Chris Miller in Financial Times

Amid discussion in Washington about whether the Trump administration will loosen restrictions on use of Chinese components in autonomous driving systems, I take a look at their impact. In comparison with Europe’s tariffs-first approach on Chinese cars, the U.S. restrictions look far more compelling.

EU leaders hoped the tariffs they imposed on Chinese EVs would provide space for European companies to catch up. But tariffs haven’t stopped German carmakers from outsourcing even more of their software and chip design to Chinese companies. The result is that even European-manufactured cars have built-in vulnerabilities. Chinese autonomous driving firms are now using European-made auto bodies — thus avoiding European tariffs — and coupling them with Chinese sensors and software to deploy robotaxis across Europe. Europe provides the bodies, China provides the brains.

America’s connected car restrictions create the opposite incentive. Restrictions on Chinese tech have induced some Chinese firms to share knowhow and intellectual property when Chinese firms are locked out. China’s Quectel, for example, is reported to have transferred software to Eagle Wireless in the US, expanding its position as a supplier of cellular modules that connect cars to the internet.

Built-in vulnerabilities in high-end vehicle components raise the risk of both espionage and sabotage

02/24/2026

New PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo by Mikhail Troitskiy

After Donald Trump’s reelection as U.S. president in November 2024, his team quietly reached out to Russia (and even more quietly to Ukraine) to explore an end to the Russia-Ukraine war. The mediation effort was initially kept entirely behind the scenes. By late spring 2025, however, it could no longer be concealed, emerging as a major focus of U.S. foreign policy and signaling confidence that clinching a peace deal required just a final, high-level push.

In August 2025, the United States moved its effort completely into the open. At a summit in Alaska with Vladimir Putin (followed by consultations with Volodymyr Zelensky), Trump hailed “private” progress—even predicting a Russia-Ukraine summit soon—yet each side gave different accounts of the talks, and Putin’s public stance remained unchanged. The Kremlin swiftly ruled out a near-term summit with Ukraine and offered no concrete concessions. Notably, it withdrew a previously floated proposal—swapping occupied southern Ukraine for unoccupied parts of the Donbas. That trial balloon drew a positive response from Ukraine and some European partners, before bursting once the discussion came to light. While voicing maximalist demands, the Kremlin has since continued to insist on keeping under wraps the content of its negotiations with Washington on Ukraine and asking that the United States also avoid any disclosures.

These demands highlight the core dilemma of secrecy in mediation. On the one hand, closed-door negotiations create flexibility conducive to deal-making. On the other hand, secrecy lets parties backtrack with impunity and can leave mediators looking naïve or compromised if things go awry. The 2025 trends in negotiations to end the Russia-Ukraine war raise the question: Under what conditions should a mediator reveal a peace effort started in private?

Latest by Mikhail Troitskiy in Survival: Tacit Coercion and Its Dilemmas: Russia and the WestTacit coercion involves cov...
02/02/2026

Latest by Mikhail Troitskiy in Survival: Tacit Coercion and Its Dilemmas: Russia and the West

Tacit coercion involves covert, plausibly deniable attacks below the threshold of war that signal an adversary to discreetly adjust its behaviour. Unlike traditional deterrence, which is based on clear red lines and explicit threats, tacit coercion leverages ambiguity and the implied risk of escalation. Examples including Russia’s sabotage of Baltic undersea cables and covert cyber operations illustrate how Russia communicates coercive intent yet maintains official deniability. This allows Moscow to issue warnings without triggering direct conflict, offering targets an off-ramp of inconspicuous compliance. But Western policymakers face a dilemma: they may publicly downplay such incidents while privately recognising the pattern. Over-reliance on ambiguity and off-ramps risks normalising sub-threshold aggression and emboldening it further.

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The New START Treaty Is Ending. What Does That Mean for Nuclear Risk?Scholars at The Fletcher School explain the treaty’...
01/29/2026

The New START Treaty Is Ending. What Does That Mean for Nuclear Risk?

Scholars at The Fletcher School explain the treaty’s legacy, its unraveling, and the dangers of a less regulated nuclear world

An interview with two Fletcher School experts on the implications of the impending expiration of the New START Treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia

Latest by Chris Miller
01/21/2026

Latest by Chris Miller

The U.S.-China AI race isn’t as close as it seemed, Chris Miller writes in a guest commentary.

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